WHEN SOLDIERS AND TRAFFICKERS CLASH:

EXPLAINING VIOLENCE AGAINST THE STATE DURING OPERATION SÃO FRANCISCO

Resumo

One of the most disruptive forms of drug-related violence is the cartel–state conflict. In affected regions, such as Mexico, Colombia and the city of Rio de Janeiro, the number of cartel-related homicides surpasses battle-related deaths in many civil wars. However, cartel–state conflicts are arguably the rarest form of drug-related violence. Criminals have strong incentives not to confront state officials, given that it would eventually lead to more state repression. To some extent, this pattern has been seen in recent military interventions in law enforcement operations in Brazil. During Operation São Francisco, however, the military faced abnormal levels of violence, leading to the first death of a soldier since the implementation of the so-called “pacification” strategy. This paper aims to explain why the criminals chose to resist and deliberately attack the pacification force, based on two cartel–state conflict theories. Whereas the first theory suggests that criminals are more likely to resort to violence against the State in order to protect their turf, given they operate in profitable and competitive markets; the second posits that cartels engage in confrontations with the state to signal resolve and military capacity to rival gangs. The theories are assessed based on primary and secondary sources, including reports from the military and non-governmental organisations, interviews and a comprehensive literature review. Finally, the different levels of violence displayed by the rivalling criminal groups during Operation São Francisco are explained in light of the proposed theories. The article concludes that the theories are complementary in explaining the resort to violence against the State.