

## PEOPLE AND PATRIOTISM IN THE HEGELIAN STATE

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### ABSTRACT

The article studies the conceptual articulation of the elements people and patriotism in the Hegel's concrete rational State, in which the people concerns to the unity that confers its psychosocial support basis and the patriotism to the sentiment that conforms it. Conclude demonstrating the centrality of patriotism for the edification and vivification of the State, because it is the ethical disposition that links the citizens in the political-spiritual unity of the people and determines their conscious integration in the State's ethical totality.

**Keywords:** Hegel. State. Nation. People. Patriotism.

### 1 INTRODUCTION

Our objective in this work is to analyze the ideas of nation, people and patriotism in the thought of the German philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (Stuttgart, August 27, 1770 – Berlin, November 14, 1831), one of the great canons of Western philosophy. The relevance of the theme lies in the fact that the entire weight of the monumental and undying theoretical construction of the Hegelian State rests precisely on the elements of people and patriotism, which in itself justifies the undertaking. But beyond just exploring the gears of this part of the ingenious Hegelian philosophical system, it is in our interest to reinforce, based on the enlightening reflections that Hegel brings, as well as the explanations of some of his scholars, that the integration of man in the State continues to be its great political destination, the only path capable of promoting its harmonious, full and free coexistence. Thus, the concrete constitutional State, which is nothing more than the objectivity of the people, has its support base in it. Patriotism, in turn, is the ethical feeling that determines the free and conscious adherence of the individual to the universality of the State.

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We will see that the people, seen as the soul of the State, at the same time that it carries within itself the particularity of the nation, overcomes its immediacy in the rational and concrete universality of the State that it shapes. In the ethical totality that is the Hegelian State, the people are not seen as a mere collective of citizens, to whom the Constitution attributes rights, but as the very subjective reality of the State, which provides it with its ethical content, to be shaped in the Constitution.

Finally, after having exposed Hegel's conception of the substantive Constitution, the political-sociological (and not legal-formal) status of the people, and all the high philosophical significance of the Hegelian State, full of vitality, substance and ethics, we conclude by importance of fostering patriotism as an effective form of a State that truly integrates man and in which he is realized as the ethical and political animal that he is.

## 2 NATION

The General Theory of the State traditionally divides it into three elements: territory, sovereignty and people. The latter, the human element, can in turn be approached from three different perspectives, namely: 1) as a synonym for population, a numerical concept that it will count, with demographic objectives, the number of people that inhabit the territory of the State, in the case of a multiplicity with no necessary link, as it does not require any other specific criteria or quality; 2) people according to the formal legal concept, that it affects the group of citizens, that is, that body of individuals who, through legal recognition, are qualified as members of the State, in democracy, bearers of political rights; and 3) according to the cultural concept, people as a political-spiritual unit forged by a concrete bond, that is, as synonymous with nation.

Thus, despite the problems and challenges related to the characterization of the national reality, the doctrine of the State admits its presence as a historical-sociological element that gives real, concrete existence to the State. In this sense, the eminent constitutionalist Paulo Bonavides teaches that:

Historical, ethnic, psychological and sociological aspects dominate the concept of nation, which also ordinarily aspires to have a political content. With the demanded politicization, the national group seeks its crowning in the principle of self-determination, organizing itself in the form of state ordering. And the State thus becomes the 'legal organization of the nation' or, according to Esmein, its 'legal personification'. (BONAVIDES, 1983, p. 79-80.)

The nation would be the unifying element of a substantial nature, capable of providing the psychosocial bases for sustaining the political-state building. The people, in this cultural sense, is the political unit that carries out the everyday plebiscite the French speaker Ernest Renan spoke about.<sup>1</sup>

Despite having been notable for the construction of a universal model of State – the concrete rational State – Hegel recognizes the particularity of the national reality that historically underlies it as its substantial principle. The State is concerned with the objectification of the spirit of a nation, so that its particulars are, long before they are dismissed, presupposed. However, already 200 years ago, in a historical moment of great nationalist enthusiasm, Hegel adopted a cautious tone in dealing with this theme, facing the nation as an inexorable historical reality and, more than that, healthy, as long as it is nuanced and elevated, by patriotism, to the superior socio-political conformation, because universal, of the people of the concrete rational State.

The nation, as its name indicates, is a community in which men are identified only by the bond of birth, the same natural and immediate determination that inscribes them within the family. It is a whole in which man finds himself as a part, not as an autonomous individual; in it he integrates without his will to do so consciously. In the national community, man plays the same role as in the family – as a member –, since in both, birth determines the natural bond of belonging to a totality that, therefore, is immediate. This feeling of immediate belonging, which

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1 “The existence of a nation is (forgive this metaphor) a daily plebiscite, as the existence of the individual is an incessant affirmation of life.” (RENAN, 2010, p. 66). The French speaker continues: “A nation is a soul, a spiritual principle. Of the things that, in the end, only one constitutes this soul, this spiritual principle. One is in the past, another in the present. unite in the posesión in común of a rich legacy of memories; the other is the current consent, the desire to live together, the willingness to continue to make good the undivided inheritance that was received in common.” (RENAN, 2010, p. 64).

would later be called nationalism, comes from man's total immersion in the culture by which he recognizes himself (and not in which he recognizes himself).

Man's belonging to the nation determines his unconditional adherence to the whole, to the ethos of his native community, which, if stuck at this point, forms an abstract State, because it is only particular, not having yet advanced to its universal configuration. The nation's culture is an essential aggregating factor for the formation of the political unit on which the State is based, but this must be elevated, through patriotic integration, to the plane of the people of the mediate State. In this, the people know themselves effectively, as the individual appears to the whole not only through the contingency of his historical-cultural belonging to the nation, in which he dissolves, but through the awareness, as such reflected, mediated, that he belongs to the State. This is the universal ethical instance in which man wants to integrate, but maintaining his autonomy, and for that very reason he uses it to build a political-objective building that is the result of his will. In this sense, for Hegel, according to the French Hegelianist Jean François Kervégan, when the State is constituted, "a community is no longer simply a 'nation', a linguistic, ethnic or cultural entity, but an organized and conscious totality, at the same time, of its strength, of its institutionalized identity" (KERVÉGAN, 2006, p. 152-3). In the same vein, Franz Rosenzweig, an eminent German Jewish philosopher and great connoisseur of Hegel's thought, explains:

[...] the individual and the nation can only [in the State] become what they are: the truly ethical individual, the nation truly people. [...] Hegel may never have come to grant the nation its own absolute right [for] he felt too strongly in the State itself, albeit in the non-national State, the complete realization of what the singular individual might desire., as the satisfaction of his will, so that he could reserve to the nation no position of its own, that of the necessary content of the body of the State. Only others, after him, refusing to insert in their deductions from the State the will of the singular individual at the starting point of thought, could also give space to the nation in the ideal of the State. (ROSENZWEIG, 2008, p. 594-5).

Thus, despite valuing the historical-cultural reality of the State, which manifests itself precisely in the particularity of the nation, it is certain that Hegel is far from wanting to give absolute character to the national element for the

conformation of the State, which would thus be a merely natural and quota. He claims:

It belongs to culture, when thinking as awareness of the singular in the form of universality, the fact that I am apprehended as a universal person, in which everyone is identical. The man is worth it because he is a man, not because he is a Jew, a Catholic, a Protestant, a German, an Italian, etc. This awareness, for which thought is valid, is of infinite importance, - it is only insufficient when it fixes itself, as cosmopolitanism, in opposing the concrete life of the State. (HEGEL, 2010, p. 203, excerpts that were highlighted by the author.)<sup>2</sup>

It can be seen, therefore, that Hegel also rejects the exclusively cosmopolitan horizon for human existence pursued by those who share an artificial understanding, opposed to the concrete life that the State encompasses. This perspective would suffer from the same unilateral precariousness as that which contemplates man's political life at the limit of his belonging to a national community of ethnic, religious, linguistic, etc. character. This apparent contradiction conveys a mutual need: as José

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- 2 Similarly, and highly advanced for his time, when dealing with the question of the State's relationship with the Jews, Hegel writes that, although political unity asserts itself with particularity in the spirit of the people, this does not mean that it should not recognize the right of entry into it (or, more, to encourage it) by foreigners: "Thus one would have had the formal right to be against the granting of civil rights to Jews, since they should not be considered merely a particular religious group, but belonging to a foreign people, thus the outcry that rose against this and other points of view overlooked the fact that they are, above all, men and that this is not just a banal, abstract quality [...], but that therein lies the fact that by granting civil rights it is, much more, the self-esteem of being a legal entity in civil-bourgeois society and that from this infinite root, free from everything else, the required equivalence of way of thinking and disposition of mind is produced. Was it not so, the separation of which the Jews are accused would, rather, be maintained and would be rightly imputed to the exclusionary State as guilt and reproach; for he would have, with that, unknown its principle, the objective institution and its power (...)? The assertion of this exclusion, since she presumed to have the highest right, was also shown in experience as the most unwise, and the government's way of acting, on the contrary, as wise and worthy." (HEGEL, 2010, p. 246).

Luiz Horta highlights it, “cosmopolitanism and nationalism cannot be contradictory, since it is the heritage of national cultures that builds the human legacy” (HORTA, 2011, p. 194). For Hegel, in the same way, the concrete culture of the people, their particular ethos, not only can, but must be assumed by the universal State. Thus:

The general principle that manifests itself in the state and becomes an object of consciousness, the form in which everything becomes real, is what constitutes the culture of a nation. However, the determined content that receives the form of universality, and that exists in the concrete reality that is the State, is the very spirit of the people. The real state is animated by this spirit in all its particular interests: wars, institutions, etc.<sup>3</sup> (HEGEL, 1999, p. 47-8).

Therefore, making the basis of the legitimacy of power in the democratic State reside in the people in its legal-formal concept (explained in the introduction, as a group of citizens without any real and necessary historical-sociological ties), does not resolve the issue about the concrete origin of which, in truth, it is only the dress in which the nation presents itself in modern constitutional texts. It is certainly possible to speak of people without a perspective of unity, of organicity, just as a multiplicity of people whose criteria for juridical qualification (which in this sense is just a classification) as citizens of the State coincide. But this is far from exhausting the historical and political meaning of this syntagm, and, on the contrary, it distances us from its real aspect - analyzed from the historical-cultural point of view, and not juridical-formal -, which is the one that establishes and bases the state legal order as a community that has a concrete legal content. Hegel highlights it:

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3 Hegel continues: “This temporal totality is an essence, the spirit of a people. Individuals belong to him; each is a child of his people and, equally, a child of his time – if his State is in the process of development. Nobody gets behind their time, much less surpasses it. That spiritual essence – the spirit of its time – is yours; he is her representative. It is from her that it arises, and it is on it that it is based. For the Athenians, the word Athens had a double meaning: first, it designated a complex of political institutions; secondly, it was the goddess who represented the spirit of the people and their unity.” (HEGEL, 1999, p. 50).

Themany, as singular [individuals], what is willingly understood as a people, are certainly a ensemble, but only as a multitude, a shapeless mass, whose movement and acting precisely with it would only be elemental, irrational, savage and frightening. When, in connection with the constitution, one still hears about the people, this inorganic collectivity, this way it can already be known that one can only expect generality and equivocal statements. – Representation, which dissolves again into a multitude of individuals the communities that are already present in those circles in which they enter politics, that is, from the point of view of the supreme concrete universality, maintains precisely with this the civil-bourgeois life and political life separate from one another and situates this, so to speak, in the air, since its basis would only be the abstract singularity of will and opinion, with that, it would be the contingent, not a stable and legitimate foundation in itself and for you. (HEGEL, 2010, p. 283-4, excerpts that were highlighted by the author).

The legal concept of people exists only in so far as the constitutions so establish it. But constitutions themselves are also legal contents; legal contents these data (or rather, constructed) prior to the procedures they establish, by the concrete unity of the nation. Rather than a legal entity, the people are a "natural" entity, a cultural unit, and that is why, historically, as it happened in the West, it was able to legalize itself, attribute political rights to itself, and thus become legally qualify as a people, beyond nation: because as a nation it became a people by conquering – not without a lot of struggle – citizenship for all.

Thus, in addition to being the nation the constituent and founding element of the bond that the unity of the State presupposes, as the substantial element of support of the State in its external aspect, of its territorial maintenance in the face of the risk of fragmentation, it is also substantial foundation of the law itself. If it is true that contemporary constitutional democracies place in the people, in the group of citizens, the formal capacity, through their majority consent, to determine the content of laws by a formal consensus, such formal consensus necessarily follows from an ethical consensus. Constitutional democracy was not shaped through the procedures that it provides, precisely because such procedures are normative contents, and, as such, they are not self-founded, but stem from a concrete structure that thus conforms and positives them. It is the cultural unity

of the people that will be able to establish, in addition to universally valid norms for them, which in itself is far beyond a merely formal origin, the very existence of such formal mechanisms for measuring the majority will, mechanisms that they are already a legal content that, beyond any discursive consensus, but rather as an ethical-cultural consensus, is already given with primacy.

The culture of a nation is, therefore, what gives the State historical reality, pushing aside the rationalist abstraction that shapes its existence on the formal plane of the exterior coexistence of contentless freedoms. The content of the State is the ethos of the people who constitute it. But the particularity of the spirit of the people, as a nation, is the historical-cultural essence of the Hegelian State only insofar as it converges with the reason that gives it knowledge of itself as a universal people. Therefore, as explained by Joaquim Carlos Salgado, a philosopher from Minas Gerais who is one of the main references on Hegelian thought in Brazil, “a people that does not constitute itself as a State does not enter, for Hegel, into history, because, since freedom is the content of history, a people only enters history if it is realized as a State.” (SALGADO, 1996, p. 411). This way we will see that a nation only fulfills itself as a State by becoming a people; this is due to patriotism.

### 3 PATRIOTISM

In the Hegelian system, after the moment of immersion in the immediate totality of the family, man sees his autonomous individuality erupt, which takes place, together with other private interests, in civil society. Civil society presents the moment of particularity that conveys a plurality to be assumed and elevated (“super assumed”<sup>4</sup>) in the entire State. The same logic can be applied to the nation, whose identifying principle based on birth makes it analogous to the moment of the family: cultural identification based on ethnic, religious, linguistic, etc., does not prevent this mass of information from being pulverized in the game of interests and in the multiplicity of wills that agglomerate in civil society, to be unified again in the ethical bosom of the State. In fact, as explained by Joaquim Carlos Salgado:

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4 Neologism used by Portuguese-speaking Hegelianists as a translation for the complex German word “Aufheben” (or “Aufhebung”), whose meaning simultaneously brings together the distinct and apparently contradictory actions of “denying”, “conserving” and “elevating”. It is a vital concept for understanding the Hegelian dialectical process by which the terms (or moments) that contradict each other are raised to a plane (or moment) in which they identify themselves without ceasing to remain in denial. About the subject, cf. SANTOS, 2007.

The State has the same universality and organicity as the family. However, organicity is not maintained by the link of an immediate integration of the member into the whole family, but mediated by the person in civil society, who separated from it into the work community. In the family, the connection of its member to the whole is made immediately, that is, not reflected, and is based on love. In the State, the bond is likewise organic, but the individual in the State has gone through the reflection of civil society and returns to the organic whole by bond, whose foundation is a rational will, situated not on the plane of love, but of the concept. (SALGADO, 1996. p. 419).

Thus, if it is true that for Hegel there is only a State when individuals consciously and reflectively direct their will towards it, there must be an aggregating factor, a centripetal force that has the power to attract and keep together the plurality of private interests, by their nature dispersive. This element has to determine the denial of the economic interest in which the modern individual is installed and its direction to the interest of the whole. In other words, knowing that the State is the plane of full identity between individual will and universal will, what can this identification operate?

Hegel states that, in addition to the "objective substantiality" of the State, with its Constitution, organs, laws and institutions, there is a "subjective substantiality [which] is the political mood" (HEGEL, 2010, p. 239). This disposition must be capable of unifying the individuals of civil-bourgeois society, of making all their particular interests converge to a single end, and of urging men to enter into an objective order, assuming it as their own, there realizing their freedom. But what exactly does such a political mood consist of? Rosenzweig responds:

"Patriotism" – this is how Hegel called the unity of the political Spirit's disposition and its object, and he sees there, as already said, the basis of the entire State. It is one of those concepts of reciprocity that articulate a subjective disposition and the objective world. Hegel designates, especially here, this objective world, in which patriotism lives, as "institutions". In the State, the "supreme right" of individuals coincides with the "supreme duty". At this point in the system, it becomes significant that Hegel will found the State not only on the juridical will, but also on the "moral" will – that will that wishes to act equally in favor of what interests him, and, more generally, he wants to find his 'subjective satisfaction' in the attainment of the higher end. Thus, institution and patriotism demand and condition each other. (ROSENZWEIG, 2008, p. 467.)

Patriotism, then, is the disposition of the soul pointed out by Hegel as the element responsible for the articulation between subjective will and objective reality, since it is a “moral” disposition for the ethical-political world. A disposition that will determine the individual to adhere to the community ethos, which is objectified in state laws and institutions. Hegel, then, understands patriotism as a subjective bond between men, a perennial and habitual disposition to union with the community whole.: “he is the disposition of mind, which in the situation and in the usual relationships of life is used to knowing that the community is the substantial basis; it's the end” (HEGEL, 2010, p. 240, excerpt highlighted by the author). As Kervégan comments:

This daily patriotism and this apparently spontaneous adherence to the universal – in reality it results from the universal, from the “ethical organism”, which in turn enlivens it – are more important to the State than military bravery; indeed, they actually make it possible, they are its very foundation. After all, without the subjective conviction that the substantial being of the political community is the condition for the effectiveness of my particular well-being, that is, without a State ethics that feeds the political disposition of all citizens, “extraordinary patriotism” only it could be the doing of exceptionally worthy individuals. Now, the modern state needs less heroes than citizens; or rather – it is one of the lessons of the French Revolution –, if you know how to have citizens, you will have, if you need, heroes. (KERVÉGAN, 2006. p. 173).

Hegel identifies in the bourgeois individual himself a disposition apt to circumvent his political alienation and direct him to the community, where he will realize himself as the political animal that he is. In him there remains a feeling of belonging to the whole, an ever-present strength and power that will lead him to an ethical-political existence, where he identifies himself with the other and with the objective product of his activity. It is a kind of transcendent, oceanic feeling, that I belong to the whole and the whole belongs to me; that between me, the other and the objective instances through which our existence is translated there is a unity, a unity that is experienced and intuited in the family (and in the nation), temporarily removed from civil society and recovered in the State.

Patriotism is the bond that unites man to the other, subjectively determining the constitution of political unity by the will to join him. It is “the will that is intelligence, that is, the integral individual personality that seeks a world above itself and whose destiny corresponds to the penetration of this world” (ROSENZWEIG, 2008. p. 416). It is the “certainty that unites the subjectivity of feeling and the substantiality of the institution, and whereby the substantial ethical subjectivity reconciles morality and law, in short, consumes the objective spirit, animates the will” (BOURGEOIS, 1999. p. 127). And in the words of Hegel, it's “trust (which can pass to a more or less cultivated discernment), - the awareness that my substantial and particular interest is preserved and contained in the interest and in the end of another” (HEGEL, 2010. p. 240, excerpts that were highlighted by the author).

Thus, patriotism is the ethical will that makes the individual a citizen because it elevates him to the higher plane of political existence, to the status of a people, the politically articulated social whole as a State. So, with Bourgeois, “patriotism is the proof of this ontological essence proper to the State, whose normative expression is that 'the supreme obligation of [individuals is] to be members of the State'” (BOURGEOIS, 2004. p. 125).

#### **4 PEOPLE, STATE AND CONSTITUTION**

If the people are usually considered an element of the State, for Hegel this totality, this spiritual unity is actually the State itself. The State is the objectivity of the people, and the people are the soul of the State. The State taken in a purely external aspect – such as the State of understanding<sup>5</sup>– it becomes an insipid objectivity, a lifeless organ, a soulless body. In the words of Hegel, “the State is an abstraction that has its own realization in the citizens, but it does exist, and only through individual will and activity is universal existence defined” (HEGEL, 1999, p. 43).

To speak, then, of a State, is to speak of a people constituted as a State. A State whose members do not feel identified as a people is not a true State. To Hegel, “the ethical substance, while containing self-awareness being united for

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5 Hegel calls the liberal State, on which his acid criticism falls, the “State of understanding” or “Abstract State”, and its characteristic is that, far from an integrated community, it is nothing more than a mechanical agglomeration of individuals. Theoretically based on the artful formulation of the social contract, the liberal State has in the people only an external collective to which it resorts to legitimize itself.

itself with its concept, is the effective spirit of a family and a people” (HEGEL, 2010, p. 173, excerpts that were highlighted by the author). It is the people, then, the substantiality that results from the organic bond between men who recognize themselves on the political plane, thus concretely grounding the State.

This totality of perfectly integrated individuals must have, in accordance with the necessity of reason, the form of a Constitution. The State Constitution is the objectification of the freedom of the people, its ethos, framed in the normative plan of the domestic state law. Therefore:

Since the spirit is only insofar as it is effective, as it is known, and the State, as the spirit of a people, is likewise the law permeating all your relationships, the customs and conscience of its individuals, thus the constitution of a determined people depends, in general, on the mode and culture of its self-awareness; in this resides its subjective freedom, and with it the effectiveness of the constitution. (HEGEL, 2010, pp. 259-60, excerpts that were highlighted by the author).

The Constitution, which gives the rational form of the people consciously constituted as a State, brings in its wake the particular substance of the ethos of this people, and that is why it is his greatest work, both for having the rational form of the law and for realizing the uniqueness of this people on the stage of history. This way, “the substance known to be free, in which the absolute obligation is equally to be, it is effective as the spirit of a people” (HEGEL, 1995, p. 295, excerpts that were highlighted by the author), and therefore, as Bourgeois comments, the “Constitution will not be that of a living State if it does not organize the spirit of a people or the soul of a nation” (BOURGEOIS, 2004, p. 126).

To the Constitution is responsible for the high task of translating the being of the people into terms of what it must be. The ethos of a people has in the constitutional State its maximum achievement, since the Constitution formalizes its substance and elevates its particularity to the objective, rational and universal plane of law. That is why the concrete constitutional state is an ethical totality, because, in it, the people organized as a State will establish as a positive right, that is, the right

posed by an act of their will, the particular content that is theirs, theirs.ethos, whose maximum expression is the Constitution<sup>6</sup>. This way, Hegel will say:

The guarantee of a constitution, that is, the need for the laws to be rational and their enforcement to be ensured, lies in the spirit of the people, namely, in the determination according to which they have self-awareness of their reason (religion is this consciousness in its absolute substantiality) and then, at the same time, in the effective organization as development of that principle. The constitution presupposes that consciousness of the spirit and, conversely, the spirit presupposes the constitution, for the actual spirit itself has a definite consciousness of its principles only while they are present to it as existing. (HEGEL, 1995, p. 311, excerpts that were highlighted by the author).

It is impossible to infer, therefore, that the provisions of the Constitution of the effective State, as they are rational, should necessarily and uniformly meet a superior, supernormative model of rationality that would indistinctly dictate the contents to which each and every State should submit. Hegelian dialectical reason rejects this typically Enlightenment and liberal abstract point of view. The Constitution of the State, being concretely taken into account by Hegel, cannot give up history and culture precisely because it has the bases for its effectiveness in them. In this sense, it cannot do without the “contingency” of its national base because it is based on this positivity of the concrete existence of the people. So, as Hegel highlights it:

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6 Law is positive, in general a) because of the way in which a State is valid, and this legal authority is the principle for knowledge of it, the science of positive law. b) according to the content, the law receives a content through the national character of a people, the degree of its historical development and the connection of all the relations that belong to the natural need. [...] With regard to the historical element of positive law, [...] the true historical consideration, the authentically philosophical point of view, [consists of] examining legislation in general and its particular determinations, not in an isolated and abstract way, but as moment dependent on a totality in connection with all its particular determinations, which constitute the character of a nation and its epoch; it is in this connection that they receive their true meaning as well as their justification.” (HEGEL, 2010, p. 49-50.)

To want to give a people a constitution a priori, even if more or less rational as to its content, - this fantasy would neglect precisely the moment in which it is more than a being of thought. That is why each people has the constitution that is adequate and that it is responsible for. (HEGEL, 2010, p. 259-60).

That explains, as it reminds Bourgeois, “Napoleon's failure to try in vain to impose on the Spaniards a constitution, albeit more rational in itself than theirs.” (BOURGEOIS, 2004, p. 124-5). Indeed, says Hegel:

The question: to whom, to what authority - and organized in what way - it is incumbent to make a Constitution, it is the same as this: who has to make the spirit of a people. If the representation of a constitution is separated from that of the spirit, as if it well existed or had existed without having a Constitution to its measure, such an opinion only proves the superficiality of thinking about the coherence of the spirit, its conscience about itself and its effectiveness. what is it called: to make a Constitution, because of this inseparability, has never been found in history, nor how to make a Code of laws: a Constitution only developed from the spirit, in identity with its own development; and, at the same time with him, he went through the necessary degrees and transformations through the concept. It is the immanent spirit and history – it is actually history and history alone – by which Constitutions are made and were made. (HEGEL, 1995, p. 312, excerpts that were highlighted by the author).

Therefore, there is no mention of a State detached from its historical positivity, since the ethics that unfold in it and formalize its law and Constitution is a work of culture. Political association, despite being concerned with the rational integration of the individual in the State, is not far from the concrete particularities through which this integration is historically verified.

## 5 FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

The Hegelian conception of people assimilates and articulates aspects as varied as the historical particularity of the nation (cultural substrate), the objectivity of the rational organization of citizens' freedom under the mantle of a Constitution (legal form) and the absolute universality of the idea that determines the dialectical identification of man with his other within the State (political-speculative horizon).

Despite recognizing the cultural reality of the nation and its indispensability for the formation of an immediate and particular bond, given by nationalism, this bond must advance to the mediate moment of patriotism, which is man's conscious will to reunite with the organic whole of the people under the universal mantle of the State that has the rational form of the Constitution. But this does not make the people a mere legal concept that designates the collective of citizens, but the unity concretely resulting from the organic bond that identifies them ethically.

The concept of the people in Hegel is directly linked to his conception of the State as an ethical totality, as such totality resides precisely in the people. But the creation and maintenance of this unity requires a disposition that urges individuals in civil society to ethically identify themselves as the we that are the people, an intersubjective universality, and thus to rush to the objective universality that is the State. This disposition of mind is patriotism, which allows the convergence of the private wills of individuals, hitherto mechanically tied to civil society, in such a way as to form the substantial ethical will to integrate, as citizens, in the concrete constitutional State. It is only by founding the State this way that this concrete people realizes its universality, and only because it is founded on this concrete political-spiritual bond that the State has its reality.

Through patriotism, then, individual freedom presented by Hegel as the economic interest (but which we can interpret as all expressions of individuality) is identified with the objective order, enabling the advent of substantial freedom that takes place in and by the rational State, the a totality that assumes difference as a founding element of identity among its citizens, in which man is the whole, being part.

This way, Hegel's political philosophy is notable for theoretically grounding the possibility, and, more than that, the need to make the State much more than a mere formal and external mechanism for the compatibilization of private freedoms, as the liberals want, but as the greatest product of substantial freedom insofar as man integrates himself freely and rationally into it. Therefore, it is necessary to foster the patriotic feeling so that, ethically identifying with its people, the man made citizen remains always, with his free and rational will, sustaining and enlivening his home, the State.

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