

DEFENCE POLICIES AND ARMED FORCES: THE CANADIAN VISION DURING AND AFTER THE COLD WAR

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ABSTRACT

Defense Policies are strategic documents formulated by governments to express its objective on the international environment about perceptions of threat and what to do in face of them. In this sense, the Armed Forces are an important instrument for national defense and guarantee of sovereignty; however, its structure and intended investments are heavily influenced by domestic pressures and perceptions of threat. As the second largest country in the world in territorial extension and located between three oceans and the United States of America, Canada inserts itself in the international context as a Middle Power and its perceptions are largely influenced by geographic issues. Thus, this research, based on Neoclassical Realism, aims to analyze the attention given in its documents to the Canadian armed forces in the Cold War period (1947-1991) and in the post-Cold War period (1991-2017), highlighting factors such as equipment acquisition, modernization, structuring forces and government investment. From the study of academic articles and official documents, it is clear that the focus on the Armed Forces changes according to the government's perception of direct threats to its sovereignty and the pressures of society, which has difficulties in identifying constraints on the international scenario and benefits from defense investments.

Keywords: Canada. Defense Policies. Armed Forces. Cold War. Post-Cold War.

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POLÍTICAS DE DEFESA E FORÇAS ARMADAS: A VISÃO CANADENSE DURANTE E APÓS A GUERRA FRIA

RESUMO

As Políticas de Defesa são documentos estratégicos formulados pelos governos para expressar objetivos no cenário internacional sobre percepções de ameaça e o que fazer diante dessas. Nesse sentido, as Forças Armadas são um importante instrumento para a defesa nacional e garantia da soberania; entretanto, a sua estrutura e os investimentos alocados são muito influenciados por pressões domésticas e percepções de ameaça. Sendo o segundo maior país do mundo em extensão territorial e localizado entre três oceanos e os Estados Unidos da América, o Canadá se insere no contexto internacional como um “Poder Médio” e tem suas percepções amplamente influenciadas por questões geográficas. Assim, esta pesquisa, por meio de embasamento no Realismo Neoclássico, tem como objetivo analisar a atenção dada em seus documentos às Forças Armadas canadenses no período da Guerra Fria (1947-1991) e no período pós-Guerra Fria (1991-2017), destacando fatores como aquisição de equipamentos, modernização, estruturação das forças e investimento governamental. A partir do estudo de artigos acadêmicos e documentos oficiais, percebe-se que o foco nas Forças Armadas muda de acordo com a percepção do governo sobre as ameaças diretas à sua soberania e às pressões da sociedade, que têm dificuldades em identificar constrangimentos no cenário internacional e benefícios com os investimentos em defesa.

Palavras-chave: Canadá. Políticas de Defesa. Forças Armadas. Guerra Fria. Pós-Guerra Fria.

POLÍTICAS DE DEFENSA Y FUERZAS ARMADAS: LA VISIÓN CANADIENSE DURANTE Y DESPUÉS DE LA GUERRA FRÍA

RESUMEN

Las Políticas de Defensa son documentos estratégicos formulados por los gobiernos para expresar sus objetivos en el escenario internacional sobre las percepciones de amenaza y qué hacer al respecto. En este sentido, las Fuerzas Armadas son un importante instrumento de defensa nacional y garantía de soberanía; sin embargo, su estructura y las inversiones previstas están fuertemente influenciadas por las presiones internas y las percepciones de amenaza. Como el segundo país más grande del mundo en extensión territorial y ubicado entre tres océanos y los Estados Unidos de América, Canadá se inserta en el contexto internacional

como una “Potencia Media” y sus percepciones están fuertemente influenciadas por cuestiones geográficas. Por lo tanto, la investigación, basada en el Realismo Neoclásico, tiene como objetivo analizar la atención prestada en sus documentos a las fuerzas armadas canadienses en el período de la Guerra Fría (1947-1991) y en el período posterior a la Guerra Fría (1991-2017), destacando factores como la adquisición de equipos, la modernización, estructuración de fuerzas e inversión gubernamental. Del estudio de artículos académicos y documentos oficiales se desprende que el enfoque en las Fuerzas Armadas cambia según la percepción del gobierno de las amenazas directas a su soberanía y las presiones de la sociedad, que tienen dificultades para identificar las limitaciones en el escenario internacional y beneficios de las inversiones en defensa.

Palabras Clave: Canadá. Políticas de defensa. Fuerzas Armadas. Guerra Fría. Post-Guerra Fría.

1 INTRODUCTION

The Armed Forces are an important instrument of the State for the guarantee of sovereignty and for the defense of national interests. However, efficient structuring depends on adequate resources, training and equipment. Usually, structure plans and resources for the area are largely influenced by threat perceptions and domestic pressures, which usually are expressed in the countries' Defense Policies.

With the second largest territorial extension in the world¹ – 9,970,610 km² –, Canada is divided into 10 provinces and three territories, in addition to having its location between the Arctic, Atlantic and Pacific oceans, and the United States of America (USA). It is important to note how this geographical positioning influences its placement on the international scenario and the domestic problems faced by the country, such as the demographic issue, with a relatively small population in relation to the size of its territory.

Despite its geographical proximity, Canada did not always show an alliance relationship with the USA, considering the United Kingdom as its main ally and protector until the middle of World War II (1939-1945). This was largely due to the fact that after its independence, the USA tried to annex the Canadian territory in

1 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. The World Factbook. Available at: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ca.html>. Accessed on: Mar. 18th, 2020.

1812², in an attempt to target the British empire that was interfering in its maritime trade constantly (CANADA, 2015).

The start of this narrowing between the two States began when tensions increased in the European theater and the prospect that a new conflict with world proportions was imminent. In this context, there was the first pronouncement by US President Franklin Roosevelt expressing concern about the integrity and security of the US territory, associating his perception of security with the idea that his neighbors were also safe (BEATTY, 1991). This discourse highlights the geographical position associated with a security issue of these two North American countries.

After this moment, meetings between the US president and the Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King and dialogues between the Departments of Defense for information exchanges were made. In 1940, both signed an agreement establishing an agency for research and debate of defense problems in the region (STACEY, 1954). From this, other agreements were signed between the two. A strengthening of the relationship between the countries was perceived with the development of partnerships in the field of joint defense, industrial defense base (IDB) and procurements.

Due to this proximity to the USA and its alliance with the United Kingdom, Canadian society has shown little support for defense investments, considering the two allies their possible saviors in case of strikes. Another factor that intensified this imaginary was the difficulty in accessing Canadian territory, due to its geographical position. Thus, Canada presented small spending on the defense portfolio, having sharp changes only in periods of conflict. The Navy, for example, had its official establishment in 1910, but only received new vessels during the First World War (1914-1918), when the Canadian shipbuilding industry has undergone a major revival to meet UK demands, taking advantage of British orders to build vessels for its own fleet.


The analysis of defense policies and understanding of the State priorities in the international scenario is important to understand the context in which Brazil itself is inserted. In addition, the Canadian situation is interesting to be studied, although little noted in the Brazilian Academy, because it is a country of

2 The Americans tried to invade Canada in 1812, seeking to reach the empire and annex his territory. Before the British reinforcement reached the mainland, the Canadian militias was the ones that fought against the invaders. The conflict ended with the victory of the British. However, this Canadian participation in its protection created in the imagination of society the idea that the militias had saved Canada and, therefore, they would be better than the national forces (WOOD, 2010).

great proportions, which considers itself as a *middle power*³, advocates the use of international organizations as a space for dialogue and prioritizes the peaceful resolution of conflicts.

Thus, from the analysis of official documents and academic articles in the area, the present work aims to understand whether the policy and focus on the Armed Forces and the defense portfolio changed according to the ruling party, or whether they follow the same trend independent of the government. For this, the work will analyze the attention paid to the Canadian Armed Forces in the Cold War period (1947-1991) and the post-Cold War period (1991-2017), highlighting factors such as equipment procurement, modernization, structuring of forces and government investment. During the Cold War period (1947-1991), the government launched three defense policies, while in the post-Cold War period (1991-2017), five policies were launched by different governments, as noted in Figure 1.

Figure 1 – Canadian Defense Policies in the Cold War and post-Cold War period



Source: O AUTORES (2020).

The articles will use **neoclassical** realism as a theoretical basis, which seeks to explain how and why States choose certain strategies and policies considering not only variables coming from the international system, but also variables internal

3 By definition, Middle Power is a "State that is not a superpower, but has the ability to exert influence on the international system, often dictating the security agenda of the moment (ALBUQUERQUE; BARRETO, 2019).

to the State (TALIAFERRO *et al.*, 2016). In addition to the introduction, the article will be divided into three sessions: the first one will analyze the Cold War period, the second one will consider the factors of the post-Cold War period and the third session will give some considerations on the situation.

2 COLD WAR PERIOD (1947-1991)

During the Cold War period, in addition to the Soviet bloc's pressure on the international system, Canada also had its policies influenced by the United States, presenting an adjustment to the conditions resulting from its geographical proximity to the country, the asymmetric distribution of power between the two countries, transnational contact, and the emergence of the USA as a superpower (KEATING, 1993).

When World War II ended, in 1945, relations in the area of defense between the USA and Canada were intensified, not only at the level of research and debate, but also at the operational one, such as the search for joint planning in the military scope with the foundation of the *Military Cooperation Committee* (LAGASSÉ, 2003). In addition to the establishment of agencies, a number of agreements, although informal, were also signed, aimed at building a single industrial base (CANADA, 1956). Much of this rapprochement in terms of defense between the two countries occurred because of geographical proximity and the idea that the security of US territory was tied to the security of Canadian territory and vice versa. Therefore, several times, Canada states in its defense documents that the great military threat to Canadian territory is due to its geographical proximity to the USA since a nuclear strike on its neighbor would affect them.

Thus, it can be noticed that during periods of conflict or its imminence, large-scale investments are made. In the same way, as in the period of the First and Second World Wars, there was an increase in the share of the Canadian federal budget focused on defense and a large investment in the country's IDB and in the training of the Armed Forces in the post-Second World War period. However, with the weakening of the idea of threat by the society, new pressures arise, bringing changes to the country's policy. Despite these changes, the fear of a nuclear war between the great powers remained at the core of government concerns.

In this period, Canada also hard pursued the status of "middle power" to separate its image from its history as a "former colony" and ensuring greater capacity for influence on the international scenario. Thus, the country observes

in the Constitution of the United Nations (UN) a space for the recognition of its performance and ability to interfere, including participation in UN operations as a primary factor for its security in its defense documents. Canada's main military action in this period was its participation in the Korean War (ALBUQUERQUE; BARRETO, 2019).

The defense policy launched by the government in 1964 was based on the reorganization of the Armed Forces in the military scope. Since the horrors of the Second War were still remembered and the spectrum of the Cold War established a real nuclear threat to the region – because of its geographical proximity to the USA –, the government saw the need for greater investments in defense and this vision is supported by society, which fears new conflicts and a country unprepared for this threat.

At the beginning of World War II, the Canadian forces had several obsolete equipment; during the war, the country's effort to improve its base of mobilization was evident, even giving greater investment in innovations for the Navy and the Air Force, which reached a degree of equality with the Ground Force. The idea was to continue with the investment in this military front, especially in technological development. Thus, in the early period of the Cold War, the budget for the area increased approximately five times (KEATING, 1993).

In the 1964 policy, the main objective of Lester B. Pearson was adding operational components to the forces, mainly aimed at enhancing the country's contribution to UN operations, improving mobilization capacity, deepening training and empowering the country to integrate partnerships with the USA. In addition, there was an introduction of new principles of mission specialization and greater emphasis on the provision of conventional forces, because of the flexible response principle (CANADA, 1964).

Another major objective of the document was the unification of the Armed Forces, which until the end of World War II consisted of three separate and independent military forces, each one with a military chief and a corresponding civil minister. Such unification would also serve as a way to save resources; the policy predicted that through this economy, approximately, 25% of the defense budget could be invested to purchase new equipment in the following years (CANADÁ, 1964). This move had already been discussed by the government and was accelerated by the publication. Mostly, this change was driven by the perception that joint operations were becoming commonplace and there was an overlap in the tasks assigned to the forces (SHAW, 2001).

Thus, the government used a unified policy to allocate the three forces under the Ministry of Defense. This coordination was possible through the committee of chiefs of staff, formed by the chairman of the administrative council, the head of the cabinet of each of the forces and the chairman of the defense research council, who were responsible for advising the minister on defense issues, coordinating the efforts of the forces, and planning and directing joint service operations (CANADÁ, 1964).

However, this initial system was not effective enough. Thus, the government established as a solution the integration of forces under a single chief, constituting a single defense team. This new chief would be responsible for planning the integration of the forces command and its operations. Although the policy was launched in 1964, it was not until 1967 that parliament approved the *Canadian Armed Forces Reorganization Act*, which gave the Minister of Defense the power to complete the unification of forces under a single service. The decree only came into force in February 1968 (ROSS, 1968).

The Department of National Defense (DND), together with the government, began to develop measures for joint machinery and some level of intelligence. In addition, the policy also intended to introduce in the DND a management system for plan and control the main programs at the department level, grouping the defense structure into several programs that would address the entire equipment of the forces and would be expressed in terms of large military missions or objectives. In addition to collaborating in the department's decision-making, this system would enable defense programs to be analyzed for their overall effectiveness, based on a specific mission. It also aimed to allocate defense resources more effectively through this system, taking into account a clear and detailed plan of action (CANADA, 1964).

In 1971, the liberal government of Pierre Trudeau launched a review of the country's defense policy. In a period of war in which the USA and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) were in dialogue and coexisting, there was some pressure for cuts in the defense sector, seeking to meet Canada's economic and social needs. There is a skepticism in society about the traditional role of the forces; for this reason, the document sought to highlight the role of the Armed Forces for the establishment of *deterrence*⁴, support the USA in the operation of alarm

4 Strategy of convincing the potential attacker that the chances of a quick strike with the achievement of its objective are small, and if they insist on aggression, they might suffer a nuclear response from the allies.

systems, against bombers and against maritime forces, and the fulfillment of all its obligations with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (CANADA, 1971).

Thus, the policy aimed to use the Armed Forces in projects that related to their responsiveness, calling them even in actions to assist the civil sector especially in remote regions, together with other government departments, in addition to promote more forms of the military sector contribute to achieve national priorities. As an example, the document addresses the work of the forces in the development of the north of the country (CANADA, 1971).

The northernmost region consists of three territories, where most of the country's indigenous population is located: Yukon, Northwest Territories, and Nunavut. This region only joined the federation in the 1960s, making its infrastructure more limited than the rest of the country (CLAUDIO, 2016). Since it is close to the Arctic Circle, its negative temperatures are almost constant, hindering the operation of conventional Armed Forces and the development of quality infrastructure. Although the Arctic is still considered in this period as an ice barrier between North America and Eurasia, the 1971 document is the first defense policy that highlights the need for the development of the Arctic region.

The policy shows the importance of the Armed Forces action in the development of infrastructure to the North and in adapting their routines and functions in relation to the cold climate. A highlight was the development of new techniques to deal with the *permafrost* and other conditions inherent in the harsh climate in the construction of defense facilities in the area. In addition, the document provided that this role would be strengthened in the future. It also highlighted the possibility of the forces supporting the country's foreign policy objectives, mainly through greater assistance in economic aid programs that benefited civil sectors of society (CANADA, 1971).

The period between the defense policy of 1971 and 1987 was marked by several changes in the international scenario, highlighting the Oil Crisis (1973), and a worsening of the Cold War, with several invasions of the USSR in the Asian and African continent. Thus, the note of the document was not the optimism that prevailed in the 1970s, having a nuclear strike by the Soviet Union as the greatest military threat to Canada at that time, and brought the intensification of *deterrence* as a strategy to face this situation. Thus, the policy established the need to invest more in conventional forces and their equipment to make them credible (CANADA, 1987).

In addition, it highlighted the belief that an armed conflict between the two blocs would begin with a war in Europe. Thus, there was a need to also contribute to the NATO' strengthening and the maintenance of its peace operation in the United Nations (UN) with adequately trained, equipped and positioned forces, but the document also recognized the limitations in the capacity to act derived from great negligence with the Armed Forces. Canada recognized the need for its actions, but it was not able to honor all its commitments in alliances and military operations, especially in the area of logistical support in Europe (CANADA, 1987).

The government decided to develop and resume some defense procurement projects, such as the Canadian Patrol Frigate (CPF) after the recognition of these limitations in the capacity of the forces. This project aimed to construct 12 frigates to replace the destroyers that had been constructed and commissioned in the 1950s and 1960s, being them class-*St Laurent*, class-*Mackenzie*, class-*Annapolis* and class-*Restigouche*. So-called class-*Halifax*, the last frigate of the project, was commissioned in 1996 (HAYDON, 2008).

Thus, in view of the recognition of this essential functions of the Armed Forces, and the need to ensure their capacity to act, the government has decided to change some of the country's commitments in order to make them more realistic, within the limits of their capacity for the mobilization of resources by improving the efficiency with which the remaining commitments would be carried out while seeking to stably and consistently increase the expenses so that the defense effort would be more sensitive to the challenges of the decade (CANADA, 1987).

It is noted that in the period during the Cold War, two governments of the Liberal Party and one government of the Conservative Party disclosed reviews of Defense policy; however, all investments in the Armed Forces and their restructuring were prioritized while the Soviet Union was considered as a strong threat in the international system, regardless of the party in power. Maintaining a structured and modernized force was critical to ensuring its security and its participation in international operations, and could contribute to the collective security arrangements. However, much of the effort intended within defense policies were not executed, due to bureaucratic issues or available resources.

3 POST-COLD WAR PERIOD (1991-2017)

An external enemy that could threaten Canadian sovereignty was not identified in the international scene after the end of the Cold War. Thus, the Conservative

Government of Brian Mulroney launched a document in 1992 to repositioned its policy in the new context. The policy showed that while it did not alter its strategic priorities – peaceful dispute resolution, disarmament, and commitment to collective security and defense – there was a need for the government to pay attention to the domestic problems it was facing, highlighting the fiscal crisis that was beginning to plague the country.

Thus, despite the importance of military forces in the pursuit of foreign policy objectives, in the defense of the country's sovereignty and in the domestic context, the government has made major cuts in the defense portfolio, especially in resources destined for NATO operations and military bases in Europe. In addition, changes began to occur in the strategic conception of the Armed Forces, by exploring the idea that the world had to be flexible and affordable; therefore, the document brought out a plan to shorten the regular force of the 84 thousand to 75 thousand men until 1995/96, the end of the Canadian base located in Baden-Soellingen and Lahr, Germany, respectively in 1993 and 1994, and the closure of the base in Bermuda in 1994. Despite several cuts, the policy aimed to procure three surveillance aircraft for the Arctic (CANADA, 1992).

Already in 1994, the liberal government of Jean Chrétien launched a review of the country's Defense White Paper that reaffirmed the need to establish large cuts in the defense portfolio to face the deepening domestic fiscal crisis. Therefore, the main idea of the policy was to reshape the defense program to operate more efficiently, reducing its participation in certain areas and maintaining a prudent level of military force to cover the objectives determined by the policy, such as ensuring the sovereignty of the country. However, the forces faced difficulties to form a defense program with such limited resources (CANADA, 1994).

One of the main changes highlighted in the document consisted of a further reduction in the contingent, a review of the traditional approach to mobilization planning, and restructuring military career, aiming to reduce the number of assignments, but reinforcing the commitment to make the career attractive to women. Another highlight included equipment procurement plans, cutting billions of dollars that were being intended to ensure the development and purchase of equipment over the next 15 years. In addition, it provided the reduction of projects that were already in progress. The document also emphasized the need for a technologically sophisticated industrial defense base, and the government was responsible for working together with industry to maintain an essential defense capability (CANADA, 1994). It is noticed that the government wanted to develop the

country's industry and maintain the capacity of the forces to act, but considerably reducing the resources allocated to these sectors.

This period encompassed the construction project of the frigates class *Halifax*, which started to operate in 1992. This program, which resulted in the construction of 12 vessels of the type and is still in operation, was a milestone in the way the government, industry and Navy related in procurement projects, as it was the first time that the force did not develop the design of the vessels that would be constructed, and the industry was responsible for having the role of managing and integrating everything. In addition, it represented a great investment and revival of the shipbuilding sector in the country, which had no continuity (WILSON, 2009).

In addition, the government established the view that the Navy's multi-purpose combat capability was essential. Thus, it highlighted a substantial decrease in anti-submarine warfare (ASW) operations⁵⁵ during the Second World War, at the same time participation in multilateral operations and in the UN would increase, mainly because the decreased need for Canadian ground troops in Central Europe to support allied defense allowed the redirection of resources and these forces. One of the government's plans to ensure this capability of the Navy was the procurement of four *Upholder* class submarines, originating in the United Kingdom (CANADA, 1994).

It is important to highlight that, at the time of the document, the submarines belonging to the Canadian fleet had been procured from the United Kingdom in the 1960s, and were extremely outdated. The government discussed the need to change this equipment since the 1980s. In the 1987 document, still during the Cold War, the Mulroney government proposed a project to develop these nuclear-powered assets together with the USA, seeking an intense presence in the Arctic region, but the project was canceled as early as 1989. Thus, the opportunity to purchase conventional submarines from the UK in the 1990s, renamed class *Victoria*, emerged as a salvation for the force, despite the disadvantages presented by the project subsequently (BARRETO, 2018).

The events of September 11th, 2001, and the beginning of the "War on Terror" again established drastic changes in the international environment. Thus, the first review launched by the Canadian government after this strike, only in 2005, created the necessity to adapt the country to the emergence of new players and new threats in the scenario. The first major threat highlighted is terrorism, which harms trade channels and destabilizes governments. The second is the proliferation

5 *Anti-submarine warfare.*

of weapons of mass destruction and fragile or bankrupt States, because, in addition to the fear that terrorist groups procure equipment in these States, the procurement of this type of weaponry tends to increase regional tensions, as in the case of the Korean Peninsula (CANADA, 2005).

Thus, the defense policy launched by the liberal government of Paul Martin emphasized the role of the Armed Forces as a tool to ensure security. In addition, the government had the perception that a redistribution of power was happening in the international system, with new players influencing the environment, such as China and India. These changes caused the perception of oneself as a middle power to be affected. This highlighted the opportunity for Canada to take a new leadership role in the international scenario through reforms in international organizations and greater participation in operations (CANADA, 2005).

Despite the role of the Armed Forces, the document did not present robust planning for defense procurements, determining the investment of \$ 13 billion over five years that had not been fulfilled. However, it was during the Martin government that the Navy's re-equipment plans began to take shape, through the search for the replacement of auxiliary oil refueling ships (AOR⁶), which had been built back in the 1960s. The need to change this equipment began to be discussed in the 1990s, but it was only in 2004 that the project, called *Joint Support Ship* (JSS) was approved (COLLINS, 2018).

Although it did not move forward after Paul Martin's replacement, mainly because the final project had become much more expensive than anticipated, it was the beginning of what would be the shipbuilding strategy launched by the Canadian government in 2010. In addition, the 2005 policy aimed to increase the size of the force by 5 thousand employees, effectively doubling the army's ability to deploy and sustain operations abroad (CANADA, 2005). It is from this document and the efforts following its launch that a process of transformation in the country's Armed Forces began (SILVA, 2018).

The Liberal government of Martin was replaced in 2006 by the conservative government of Stephen Harper, which had as one of his first measures the freezing of all processes of procurement made by the previous government for review. Despite this, it is necessary to emphasize that the Harper campaign highlighted greatly the fragile situation of the Armed Forces, with extremely obsolete equipment, and the need to invest in this area using the country's participation in the operation in Afghanistan to highlight the military scope.

6 *Auxiliary Oiler Replenishment.*

The defense document released by his government in 2008 characterized the international system as unpredictable, identifying globalization and terrorism as the main threat; and its main objective was the restoration and modernization of the Armed Forces, including highlighting the relationship between military development and benefits for the country's industry (CANADA, 2008). It is important to highlight that Canada has traditionally associated investments in defense procurements with the generation of economic benefits as a way to ensure greater support from society for these expenditures (WILSON, 2009).

Another point of instability and possible threat in the international context was the defrosting in the Arctic, which could threaten the security and sovereignty of the country, with the possibility of navigation in the Northwest Passage and exploitation of natural resources by other nations within its territory. Moreover, unlike policies of the Cold War period, the 2008 document brought the issue of international operations as a tool for ensuring the stability of the environment and as a form of projection and leadership in the system. Thus, it highlighted the possibility of participation in UN and NATO operations, however, it clarified that it would act in operations to support Canadian international objectives and its national interests (CANADA, 2008).

The 2008 policy set out the objective of restructuring the country's Armed Forces, balancing four pillars – personnel, equipment, training and infrastructure – and investing in the purchase of equipment and modernization of forces, which the government planned to be 490 billion over 20 years (Canada, 2008). Despite the attempt to establish long-term planning for investments and procurements in the defense area, much of what was proposed by the Harper government was not executed, mainly by the opinion of the opposition, which considered only a list, without considering actions on how to achieve the proposed objectives; and by the economic crisis of 2008, which affected the whole world (SILVA, 2018).

It is also interesting to note that the strategy planned to increase the number of militaries to 70 thousand regular forces and 30 thousand reserve forces; replace the main fleets of equipment, procuring, in particular, 15 vessels to replace existing destroyers and frigates, 65 next-generation combat aircraft and a new family of vehicles and ground combat systems; and strengthen the ability to deploy and sustain operations (CANADA, 2008).

At the end of 2015, Liberal Justin Trudeau took up the position as prime

minister, launching, in 2017, the defense policy review called *Strong, Secure and Engaged*, that had as a novelty in its elaboration process the popular consultation for several months before it was launched, allowing society to express what they considered as priorities for their country. The online page that was created aimed to be accessible, containing explanations of how the process of drafting a policy and other important points for the defense portfolio worked, such as the budget of the Department of Defense and the changes that were intended to be made in the procurement process.

Thus, the document takes on a note of urgency, showing the need for investment and modernization of the Armed Forces to ensure the capacity of the state to act in the face of a scenario full of threats and that presents constant changes, not only in the nature of conflicts and threats, but also regarding the balance of power. Its objectives and strategies were configured in the long term, aiming at investments for the next 20 years (CANADA, 2017); this long-term planning helps to build predictability within the defense portfolio and highlights the need for continuity of resources, since all modernization projects in the area are not completed in a short period.

In addition, as the document released in 2008, the policy emphasized the idea of relationship between military development and benefits for the country's industry; however, it greater highlights the development of national defense industries, seeking to consolidate them and make them competitive in the international market (CANADA, 2017). Thus, in addition to maintaining the foundations of the previous government policy, the Trudeau Government devoted greater effort to establish clear and real strategies to achieve all the objectives listed in the document.

The main threats were those that transcended borders, such as terrorism and threats in the space and cyber domain. It also raised concerns about the strong presence of non-state players in several conflicts and changes affecting the dynamics of the Arctic region. It is interesting to note that this document was the first to highlight the *Five-Eyes Partners*, which encompass in addition to Canada, the USA, the UK, Australia and New Zealand, as an important alliance for the security of the country. To meet the challenges listed, the government again highlighted the need for the renewal of the Armed Forces. Thus, seeking transparency, the Trudeau government not only highlighted the future procurements of forces, in line with

plans established in other governments, but also discriminated against a budget target for the coming years, to make its plans possible (CANADA, 2017).

The plan addressed in the document involved increasing defense spending in the coming years, targeting \$24.6 billion in defense spending in 2026-27, raising current figures by almost 70% in 10 years. Thus, in this period, the country's defense spending is expected to reach the target of 1.4% of the country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP). One of these investments is the Shipbuilding Strategy (NSS⁷) launched by the Harper government in 2010, and consisting of one of the largest attempts at modernization of the Canadian Navy. In addition, it was intended to adopt reforms in the defense procurement system, which began to undergo changes still in the Harper government, mainly adopting a model that considers the entire life cycle⁸ of the equipment in its planning and cost estimation (CANADA, 2017).

So, it is noticed that after the Cold War and after the perception of a great traditional threat on the international scenario, Canada had greater domestic pressures, mainly because of fiscal crises, compromising not only resources and budget, but also its mobilization capacity, equipment and the structure of the Armed Forces in the future. Since the attack of 09/11, it was noticed an increase in the perception of non-traditional threats such as terrorism and those linked to economic issues. Over the years, all governments have been trying to establish measures to increase the capabilities of the forces and remain prepared to meet their national and international commitments.

FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

During the Cold War, the perception of threat, both of the government and of society, coming from the USSR on the international scenario contributed to the administration being able to focus part of its investments in the defense portfolio, including perceiving a continuity in the country's policies. In that period, the country's spending on the defense portfolio were around 6% of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP), according to data from the *Stockholm International Peace Research*

7 *National Shipbuilding Strategy*.

8 The Canadian procurement system is configured as a multi-departmental model that usually divides its process into five stages, starting with the identification of the needs of the Armed Forces and the project itself, and ending with the delivery of the equipment at its full operational capacity (BARRETO, 2020).

*Institute*⁹ (SIPRI). This period of investments led to major industrial developments in the country, mainly in the aviation area. Much of this development is resulting from the war efforts that the country has made.

However, since the end of the traditional threat perception, there is a change – not immediate – in its documents. Analysis shows that when the population no longer considered the Soviet Union as a strong and direct threat to its territory, the greatest concern with domestic problems became more prominent. Canada had been undergoing major cuts since the 1970s, because of a financial crisis that plagued the country; however, the 1990s increased this situation, which it led to discontinuities in the country's defense policy.

Despite maintaining as a basis the defense of the country's sovereignty, in the documents of 1992 and 1994, the government does not consider international operations as a priority. They are still cited in the document, but the government clarifies it believes that the country's participation in all of them is not necessary. This differs from the speech of the first three documents, in which it participated in all UN peace operations, claiming to be fundamental to ensure the stability of the international environment and the defense of the country. In addition, since the crisis and the lack of a palpable threat on the international scenario, State resources are directed to the domestic context, putting aside its defense forces and equipment.

A change in this situation of the Armed Forces and operations is noticed in the document of 2005, because of the terrorist attacks of 09/11 in the USA. Through the aggravation of this non-traditional threat on the international scenario, Canada tried to re-prioritize investments in Armed Forces, primarily aiming at actively participating in international operations with its allies. Unlike the period of the Cold War, in which Europa was the scene of conflicts, in this second moment, the focus is on North America and the Middle East is the source of these threats. Therefore, the focus is participation in the international operations of the alliance and greater investment in the modernization and restructuring of the Armed Forces, not establishing Europe as a priority in itself, but as a continent that strengthens the US deterrent.

However, this new focus on the defense portfolio and the increase in

9 Available at: <https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex>.

defense spending for their involvement in these actions is not well received, mainly because there is still a sense of security in Canadian society.

So, through the rise of terrorism and greater instability in the international environment, there is a new emphasis on Canadian defense policy, but there has not been a quickly increased investment and with significant growth as in the Cold War period. Governments faced difficulties in these changes, not only having resistances in society about the need for this spending, but also facing circumstantial difficulties, such as the crisis of 2008. It was only from the Harper government that we could see an increase in projects in relation to the Armed Forces that really were implemented, such as the shipbuilding strategy, which has been maintained by the Trudeau government. Thus, it can be noted how the focus on the defense portfolio and the Armed Forces was not directly linked to a specific party, but to the conditions of the international scenario and to domestic variables, such as a sense of security and fiscal crises.

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